 |
|
I would consider it malpractice on part of the appeals
Posted on: May 23, 2022 at 15:25:46 CT
Spanky KU
Posts:
146416
Member For:
21.02 yrs
Level:
User
M.O.B. Votes:
2
attorney to not try to use Habeas as a grounds in Federal Court instead of stating in State Court as Federal Law requires.
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/21pdf/20-1009_19m2.pdf
"...(i) A prisoner “bears the risk in federal habeas for all attorney errors made in the course of the representation.” Coleman, 501 U. S., at 754. And, because there is no constitutional right to counsel in state postconviction proceedings, a prisoner must ordinarily “bea[r] responsibility” for all attorney errors during those proceedings, Williams, 529 U. S., at 432, including responsibility for counsel’s negligent failure to develop the state postconviction record. This Court’s prior cases make this point clear. See, e.g., Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U. S. 1; Williams, 529 U. S. 420; Holland v. Jackson, 542 U. S. 649 (per curiam). Thus, a prisoner is “at fault” even when state postconviction counsel is negligent. Pp. 14–15.
(ii) Respondents propose extending Martinez so that ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel can excuse a prisoner’s failure to develop the state-court record under §2254(e)(2). But unlike judgemade exceptions to procedural default, §2254(e)(2) is a statute, and thus, this Court has no power to redefine when a prisoner “has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings.” Nor is it plausible, as respondents contend, that Congress might have enacted §2254(e)(2) with the expectation that this Court would one day open the door to allowing the ineffective assistance of state postconviction counsel to be cause to forgive procedural default. Finally, Martinez itself cuts against respondents’ proposed result. Martinez foreclosed any extension of its holding beyond the “narrow exception” to procedural default at issue in that case. See 566 U. S., at 9. That assurance has bite only if the State can rely on the state-court record. The cases here demonstrate the improper burden imposed on the States when Martinez applies beyond its narrow scope, with the
sprawling evidentiary hearing in Jones’ case being particularly poignant. Pp. 15–19.
Edited by Spanky at 15:27:39 on 05/23/22
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/21pdf/20-1009_19m2.pdf
"...(i) A prisoner “bears the risk in federal habeas for all attorney errors made in the course of the representation.” Coleman, 501 U. S., at 754. And, because there is no constitutional right to counsel in state postconviction proceedings, a prisoner must ordinarily “bea[r] responsibility” for all attorney errors during those proceedings, Williams, 529 U. S., at 432, including responsibility for counsel’s negligent failure to develop the state postconviction record. This Court’s prior cases make this point clear. See, e.g., Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U. S. 1; Williams, 529 U. S. 420; Holland v. Jackson, 542 U. S. 649 (per curiam). Thus, a prisoner is “at fault” even when state postconviction counsel is negligent. Pp. 14–15.
(ii) Respondents propose extending Martinez so that ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel can excuse a prisoner’s failure to develop the state-court record under §2254(e)(2). But unlike judgemade exceptions to procedural default, §2254(e)(2) is a statute, and thus, this Court has no power to redefine when a prisoner “has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings.” Nor is it plausible, as respondents contend, that Congress might have enacted §2254(e)(2) with the expectation that this Court would one day open the door to allowing the ineffective assistance of state postconviction counsel to be cause to forgive procedural default. Finally, Martinez itself cuts against respondents’ proposed result. Martinez foreclosed any extension of its holding beyond the “narrow exception” to procedural default at issue in that case. See 566 U. S., at 9. That assurance has bite only if the State can rely on the state-court record. The cases here demonstrate the improper burden imposed on the States when Martinez applies beyond its narrow scope, with the
sprawling evidentiary hearing in Jones’ case being particularly poignant. Pp. 15–19.
Edited by Spanky at 15:27:39 on 05/23/22
Please explain why this message is being reported.
MESSAGE THREAD
- 
I would consider it malpractice on part of the appeals - Spanky KU - 5/23 15:25:46